The Tactical Role of Cyberwarfare

Tech layoffs. AI and journalism.

(A Shahed drone - from Wikipedia)

Digital Conflicts is a bi-weekly briefing on the intersections of digital culture, AI, cybersecurity, digital rights, data privacy, and tech policy with a European focus.

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N.7 - 26 April 2024
Authors: Carola Frediani and Andrea Daniele Signorelli

INDEX
- The Tactical Role of Cyberwarfare (and Other Emerging Technologies)
- Global Profile of the Tech Workforce
- In brief

WAR IN UKRAINE
The Tactical Role of Cyberwarfare (and Other Emerging Technologies)

A few days ago, the Ukrainian hacktivist group Cyber Resistance claimed on Telegram to have broken into the computer systems of the Russian drone manufacturer Albatross and stolen 100 gigabytes of data. This information is expected to be used in a series of coordinated articles with the InformNapalm outlet, which in an April 15 article claimed that it could confirm the involvement of the agricultural drone company Albatross in the development of the "suicidal" Shahed drones, designed by Iran and used by Russia against Ukraine.

In February, a mysterious group of hackers called the Prana Network leaked some information about an Iranian military company and circulated confidential documents claiming that Russia had purchased at least 6,000 Shahed 136 drones since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Russia has also reportedly received extensive assistance in setting up local production lines for drones, and has rewarded this assistance with tons of gold ingots. According to the documents, the Russians paid nearly $200,000 per drone. However, the price would also include assistance in setting up autonomous production, after which the unit price would drop to $48,000. "Now, Russia is seeking both to buy and to manufacture thousands of more advanced drones," wrote Hareetz, which examined the documents.

Some rumors about Russia's efforts to establish its own production lines for these drones had already surfaced months ago, when the Financial Times wrote that "Albatross, a Russian group that previously specialized in farming tech, built its new factory inside the Alabuga special economic zone in Tatarstan — a site the US has claimed is the center of the Tehran-supported effort to develop Russia’s capacity in making drones". In December, the U.S. placed Albatross on its Entity List.

In early April, the Tatarstan region was targeted by Ukrainian forces. Russian media reported that two drones struck a dormitory in Russia's Alabuga special economic zone, more than 1,200 kilometers from the northeastern Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, near the Russian border, writes Reuters, which confirmed the available images.

"Ukrainian military expert Oleh Zhdanov said Ukraine was likely targeting a new drone production facility at the Alabuga site, predicting such deep strikes inside Russia could become more common given the capabilities of the drones now being produced by Kyiv", reported Radio Free Europe (a media outlet funded by the U.S. Congress and declared an "undesirable organization" by Russia).

This whole story illustrates how different dimensions are intertwined in the war in Ukraine: traditional kinetic warfare, the massive and diversified use of drones by both sides, the military conversion of industries and technologies, cyber-attacks, leaks and propaganda.
In this intertwining, each technological element is never decisive on its own, but can provide tactical or temporary advantages if deployed in the right circumstances. Therefore, the hype generated by some narratives on hybrid warfare a few years ago needs to be tempered.

A recent report by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, which analyzes the role of emerging technologies in the Ukrainian conflict, makes the same point.
"Technological innovations coupled with the lack of large-scale interstate conflicts, the rise of global competition through other means, and the global focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency have led to a large focus on ‘hybrid’ forms of warfare. This has in turn led to an expectation that confrontation in the 21st century would largely take place below the threshold of overt war and would often be waged through surrogates – and increasingly through technological surrogates (such as long-range drones during the so-called ‘War on Terror’ or AI-enabled disinformation activities more recently). These analyses mirrored a world expecting war to become small, peripheral, and hybrid, as well as remote, precise, efficient, and less deadly".

According to the authors, this has led to incorrect predictions: in reality, not only do the traditional elements of warfare (ammunition, artillery, logistics, personnel) remain central, but each technological element is contextually linked to the traditional ones. The technological element becomes a competitive advantage depending on how it fits into the context. Managing this complexity is what makes the difference.

Certainly, "the war in Ukraine shows that drones – of various levels of sophistication, autonomy, and types of functions – have become an essential element of modern warfare", explains the report. Ukraine was able to benefit from the use of drones especially early on, while more recently Russia has also begun to use them extensively. "The early phases of the war were characterized by the lack of widespread use of UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) by the Russian side. Some experts indeed argue that Russia’s lack of drone usage for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance contributed to its early invasion blunders, notably due to the lack of situational awareness resulting from the absence of drones".

Drones also served as an effective propaganda tool for the Ukrainians, with videos of successful attacks on Russian troops and tanks circulating on social media and galvanizing support. Today, according to the report, drone reconnaissance provides Ukrainian forces with an estimated 86 percent of all identified targets.

But the most interesting aspect of drones is how Ukraine acquired and developed them. Ukraine was able to successfully leverage the global ecosystem of "big tech", its civilian commercial technology sector, domestic startups, NGOs, and even individual civilians for its "drone war”, shortening the cycle between prototyping, experimentation, testing, production, and deployment.
"While only seven companies were making drones in Ukraine before the war, there are now up to making over 300 types of drones".

Drones immediately lead us to another technological element of this war: the use of AI systems. Artificial intelligence is an area where it is more difficult to assess real uses and outcomes, and where hype and propaganda (including from the vendors of these systems) are an important factor. However, according to the report, news from both Russia and Ukraine seems to indicate that we are approaching nearly autonomous or increasingly autonomous weapons systems.

In any case, Ukraine has understood the need to tap into data, including those collected by the vast number of devices capturing images, audios and videos of the war, or those coming from open source information. In this logic, the Ukrainian authorities have opened Telegram channels or apps where citizens can send videos and photos of Russian troops and materials.

According to a recent article in The Economist, Ukrainian companies like Molfar offer AI systems to identify targets to hit. These systems are also being used in counterintelligence to detect possible traces of spies and traitors. Needless to say, some of the reported examples are quite disturbing.

Finally, there is the element of cyber warfare. Once again, the war in Ukraine has lowered expectations for cyber capabilities. The reasons are many, and the report covers them all, including highlighting the role of the private sector in Kiev's cybersecurity defenses, from Microsoft to Starlink.
"Ukrainian authorities have relied on a rich network of governmental and private-sector actors, both foreign and domestic, to quickly identify and respond to cyber threats".

But Ukraine has also been a protagonist in cyber offensives, through the establishment of the IT Army, a kind of volunteer army recruited online to participate in cyber attacks against Russia.
"According to research by the ETHZ Centre for Security Studies, the IT Army has a highly coordinated structure and activities, with a ‘core team’ housed by Ukrainian authorities. While a central coordinating body does exist, the IT Army maintains a decentralized and diffuse organizational structure", the report says, adding that the use of the IT Army and extraterritorial hackers has also contributed to the blurring of legal and normative boundaries.
"For example, if a Ukrainian citizen (or other national) conducts a cyberattack disrupting Russian troop communications or infrastructure, or in any way affects or reduces – even marginally – Russia’s combat capabilities, should they be considered a legitimate target, even in a foreign country?".

In addition to that, the 2022 ETH study also said other interesting things, pointing to a gray area and ambiguity in the cooperation (or indifference) of some Western tech companies in the face of the violation of their terms of service by the IT Army (such as using anti-DDoS services to host DDoS attack tools, etc.).

In conclusion, and returning to the report by the Geneva Center for Security Policy, the authors emphasize that offensive cyber operations, which also require long preparation times, can be more effective in the "pre-war phases", to gather information and analyze enemy systems to identify vulnerabilities that can be exploited later. During a conflict, they are mainly low-intensity tools for disruption and subversion.

TECH AND WORK
Global Profile of the Tech Workforce

As the wave of layoffs continues, what information do we have about the IT workforce, the gender gap, the growth of freelancers and outsourcing, and the countries that are hiring? And why is it so hard to get consistent data?

According to Layoffs.fyi (a site run by entrepreneur Roger Lee that monitors all tech sector layoffs), more than 428,000 people were laid off by thousands of companies between 2022 and 2023, including players like Alphabet, Microsoft, Meta, and X (which laid off 82 percent of its staff in its transition from Twitter to X.com). In the first three months of 2024, there were 58,000 layoffs across 237 companies and startups.

What happened? The volatility shown in this graph shows that the hiring that occurred in the IT market in 2020 to meet the increased demand for digital services during the pandemic was not the beginning of a long-term trend. In fact, due to rising energy costs and a return to post-pandemic normalcy, the data shows that 2020 was the exception, not the rule.
Donata Columbro writes about this on the Guerre di Rete website (Italian only).

IN BRIEF

DEEPFAKE
The abuse of sexual deepfakes - PODCAST - Tech Won’t Save Us

AI AND JOURNALISM
A new study by the Associated Press reveals that generative artificial intelligence is already reshaping the roles and workflow of newsrooms. Nearly 70% of newsroom contributors from various backgrounds and organizations report using technology for creating social media posts, newsletters, and headlines, for translating and transcribing interviews, and for writing stories - Poynter

BOOKS
Algorithms of Resistance - The Everyday Fight against Platform Power - by Tiziano Bonini and Emiliano Treré – MIT Press