Digital Conflicts is a bi-weekly briefing on the intersections of digital culture, AI, cybersecurity, digital rights, data privacy, and tech policy with a European focus.
Brought to you with journalistic integrity by Guerre di Rete, in partnership with the University of Bologna's Centre for Digital Ethics.
New to Digital Conflicts? Subscribe for free to receive it by email every two weeks.
N.18 - 4 December 2024
Author: Carola Frediani and Andrea Daniele Signorelli
In this issue:
SPECIAL REPORT – Two Internet Cables and the Baltic Sea Breaking Point
Reports and insights
SPECIAL REPORT
Two Internet Cables and the Baltic Sea Breaking Point
Two damaged cables may not constitute proof, but they are enough to spark investigations and suspicions of hybrid warfare—especially when they lie underwater in the politically tense waters of the Baltic Sea. These waters connect nations such as Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Lithuania, and Russia, all key players in a mystery that will eventually involve an unexpected actor, as we’ll see. This is the same sea traversed by the Nord Stream pipeline (sabotaged in 2022 – a sabotage attributed by The Wall Street Journal in August to Ukrainian forces) and frequently plagued by GPS signal interference, as previously reported in this newsletter.
On December 24, two undersea Internet cables in the Baltic Sea were suddenly damaged within a short period of time. The first reports came from the companies that manage these infrastructures.
The first cable, a 218 km link between Lithuania and the Swedish island of Gotland – called the BCS East-West Interlink – was reportedly physically damaged at 10 a.m. local time on Sunday, according to telecommunications company Telia Lietuva.
The second, called C-Lion, spans 1,200 kilometers along with gas and power lines from Helsinki (Finland), to Rostock (Germany). According to Cinia, the Finnish state-owned company that manages the connection, the damage occurred late Sunday night (early Monday morning). Repairs, which will require a specialized ship en route from France, could take up to two weeks.
The damage occurred in Sweden's exclusive economic zone south of the island of Öland, so Swedish authorities are responsible for the investigation. Swedish Defense Minister Carl-Oskar Bohlin confirmed this to SVT, saying that the case is under active investigation.
In this highly uncertain context, a joint statement by the foreign ministers of Finland and Germany on Monday came about pretty strong:
"We are deeply concerned about the severed undersea cable connecting Finland and Germany in the Baltic Sea. The fact that such an incident immediately raises suspicions of intentional damage speaks volumes about the volatility of our times. A thorough investigation is underway. Our European security is not only under threat from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, but also from hybrid warfare by malicious actors. Safeguarding our shared critical infrastructure is vital to our security and the resilience of our societies".
The incident also occurred just two days after the Russian ship Yantar was escorted away from an area containing critical cables in the Irish Sea. Yantar is officially classified as a general-purpose oceanographic research and underwater salvage vessel, but its presence raised concerns about the security of cables between Ireland and the UK that carry global Internet traffic for tech giants such as Google and Microsoft, The Guardian reported.
But the situation is complex. In August, Beijing admitted that a Chinese-owned ship had damaged a critical pipeline in the Baltic Sea, but claimed the incident was accidental.
This context becomes relevant because shortly after the recent Internet cable damage, some open source intelligence (OSINT) researchers highlighted the presence of a Chinese ship, the Yi Peng 3, in the area.
By mid-week, the authorities also began to focus on the Chinese ship. Swedish police, who are leading the investigation into the alleged sabotage, announced that a Chinese ship off the Danish coast was "of interest". Meanwhile, the Danish navy began shadowing the Chinese-registered cargo ship.
The ship, identified as the aforementioned Yi Peng 3, allegedly crossed paths with the two cables on Sunday and Monday, around the time they were reportedly cut. The Danish navy was shadowing the ship as it passed through waters between Sweden and Denmark, according to The Guardian.
The Danish Defense Command made a brief statement confirming its presence in the area:
"The Danish Defence can confirm that we are present in the area near the Chinese ship Yi Peng 3. The Danish Defense has no further comments at this time."
As noted by Maritime-Executive, the Yi Peng 3 “was outbound from St. Petersburg in the Baltic during the timeframe of the two back-to-back cable breaks. Its AIS record [automatic identification system, a maritime technology for exchanging navigational and identification data] shows that it exhibited unusual course and speed changes at positions that may have corresponded to the twin incidents. The ship was intercepted by a Danish Navy patrol ship as it transited towards the Great Belt on November 18. The bulker then went to anchor in the Kattegat, with the patrol ship waiting nearby. Despite the appearance of formal intervention, Denmark stopped short of announcing that the ship had been detained”.
The Yi Peng 3, a Chinese-registered cargo ship en route from the Russian port of Ust-Luga to Port Said, Egypt, reportedly passed near the Swedish-Lithuanian and Finnish-German cables around the time they were cut, according to the maritime monitoring group MarineTraffic. The Finnish site MTV Uutiset even produced a video showing the coincidence (screenshots provided).
Owned by Ningbo Yipeng Shipping, a company with only one other ship, the Yi Peng 3 is based near the eastern Chinese port city of Ningbo. A company representative told the Financial Times that "the government has asked the company to cooperate with the investigation", but declined further comment.
The detention of a foreign ship without a warrant is rare. But a rarely invoked clause in a century-old treaty could give Denmark the legal authority to detain the Yi Peng 3, according to Kenneth Øhlenschlæger Buhl, a maritime law expert at the Royal Danish Defense College.
Some believe the Danish Navy's aggressive move signals a change in policy. "Several officials familiar with the investigation suspect that Russia orchestrated the sabotage, possibly using the Chinese-flagged ship to maintain plausible deniability (...) and that the Chinese government was likely unaware of the plot", the Wall Street Journal reported. How such an operation could be practically carried out, however, has not yet been explained by anyone. Russia, for its part, has rejected any accusation, pointing the finger at the Ukrainians.
Despite Monday’s immediate joint statement by the Finnish government together with the German government, Finnish officials have issued more measured statements, noting that accidental cable breaks are common worldwide, with about 200 incidents a year, mostly caused by anchors or trawling nets. Finnish Prime Minister Orpo said Tuesday that it was too early to talk about sabotage. U.S. officials interviewed by CNN also urged caution.
A few days ago, Sweden has formally asked China to co-operate with an investigation into damage to the two cables in the Baltic Sea.
Whether the incident ultimately proves to be accidental or deliberate, it underscores tensions in the Baltic region and growing concerns about the security of critical communications networks, particularly undersea cables.
Last September, the U.S. reportedly detected increased Russian military activity around key undersea cables, according to two U.S. officials who spoke to CNN. Russia, they said, is increasingly investing in a dedicated unit of surface ships, submarines and naval drones under the "General Staff Main Directorate for Deep Sea Research" (GUGI), which, according to US think tanks, appears to have a particular interest in the Baltic Sea.
Last May, Russia announced a plan to unilaterally extend its maritime borders with Lithuania and Finland, both NATO members (Finland joined in 2023). The plan was later removed from the government's website, according to the Financial Times.
Finally, just a month ago, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius arrived in Rostock to inaugurate NATO's new Baltic Sea Command. The Commander Task Force Baltic will be led by a German admiral and will be including officers from 11 other nations. It aims to protect key supply routes, trade corridors and critical infrastructure.
In Brief
ITALY
What We Know About the Starlink Test in Lombardy
Elon Musk's satellite communications company is being mentioned in connection with a pilot project aimed at overcoming delays in broadband deployment plans in Italy. Here's what we know so far.
"The Italian government has long toyed with the idea of relying on satellites to avoid missing the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (part of the Next Generation EU) deadlines and losing European funds. However, Internet from space might not offer the same quality of connection," writes Zorloni in Wired Italy [Italian only].
EU TECH STARTUPS
“Don’t Sell!”
Xavier Niel, a leading European tech investor, argues that Europe can create AI industry leaders without the billions raised by US rivals - provided founders resist early buyouts. Financial Times.